Cambridge Working Group Consensus Statement on the Creation of Potential Pandemic Pathogens (PPPs)
This is a statement resulting from the discussion of 18 researchers and concerned individuals in Boston. It expresses concern about the ongoing GOF research and calls for it to be curbed. It was ultimately signed by 295 individuals including Paul Berg and Stanley Falkow, architects of the 1975 Asilomar conference.
Monday, July 14, 2014
Sunday, June 29, 2014
June 29, 2014
TWIV291 from 33rd annual meeting of the American Society for Virology (ASV) in Fort Collins, Colorado.
Ron Fouchier was a guest.
Ron Fouchier was a guest.
Thursday, June 26, 2014
June 26, 2014
Nature Editorial - Biosafety in the balance. An accident with anthrax demonstrates that pathogen research always carries a risk of release — and highlights the need for rigorous scrutiny of gain-of-function flu studies.
Nature. 2014 Jun 26;510(7506):443.
“The fewer the labs that perform experiments, the smaller is the risk of an accidental release. But as the CDC accident reminds us, should gain-of-function flu research proliferate, in particular at facilities with less than exemplary biosafety standards, the risks of an accidental release of a potentially pandemic flu virus will be multiplied.”
Nature. 2014 Jun 26;510(7506):443.
“The fewer the labs that perform experiments, the smaller is the risk of an accidental release. But as the CDC accident reminds us, should gain-of-function flu research proliferate, in particular at facilities with less than exemplary biosafety standards, the risks of an accidental release of a potentially pandemic flu virus will be multiplied.”
Saturday, June 14, 2014
June 11, 2014
Circulating avian influenza viruses closely related to the 1918 virus have pandemic potential.
Watanabe T, Zhong G, Russell CA, Nakajima N, Hatta M, Hanson A, McBride R, Burke DF, Takahashi K, Fukuyama S, Tomita Y, Maher EA, Watanabe S, Imai M, Neumann G, Hasegawa H, Paulson JC, Smith DJ, Kawaoka Y.
Cell Host Microbe. 2014 Jun 11;15(6):692-705. doi: 10.1016/j.chom.2014.05.006.
Comment to be posted.
Watanabe T, Zhong G, Russell CA, Nakajima N, Hatta M, Hanson A, McBride R, Burke DF, Takahashi K, Fukuyama S, Tomita Y, Maher EA, Watanabe S, Imai M, Neumann G, Hasegawa H, Paulson JC, Smith DJ, Kawaoka Y.
Cell Host Microbe. 2014 Jun 11;15(6):692-705. doi: 10.1016/j.chom.2014.05.006.
Comment to be posted.
Sunday, June 1, 2014
June 2014
Airborne transmission of highly pathogenic H7N1 influenza virus in ferrets.
Sutton TC, Finch C, Shao H, Angel M, Chen H, Capua I, Cattoli G, Monne I, Perez DR.
J Virol. 2014 Jun;88(12):6623-35. doi: 10.1128/JVI.02765-13. Epub 2014 Apr 2.
Sequence changes associated with respiratory transmission of H7N1 influenza virus in mammals.
Dermody TS, Sandri-Goldin RM, Shenk T.
J Virol. 2014 Jun;88(12):6533-4. doi: 10.1128/JVI.00886-14. Epub 2014 Apr 2.
Sutton TC, Finch C, Shao H, Angel M, Chen H, Capua I, Cattoli G, Monne I, Perez DR.
J Virol. 2014 Jun;88(12):6623-35. doi: 10.1128/JVI.02765-13. Epub 2014 Apr 2.
Sequence changes associated with respiratory transmission of H7N1 influenza virus in mammals.
Dermody TS, Sandri-Goldin RM, Shenk T.
J Virol. 2014 Jun;88(12):6533-4. doi: 10.1128/JVI.00886-14. Epub 2014 Apr 2.
Monday, May 12, 2014
May 12, 2014
Little evidence of subclinical avian influenza virus infections among rural villagers in Cambodia.
Gray GC, Krueger WS, Chum C, Putnam SD, Wierzba TF, Heil GL, Anderson BD, Yasuda CY, Williams M, Kasper MR, Saphonn V, Blair PJ.
PLoS One. 2014 May 12;9(5):e97097. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0097097. eCollection 2014.
In 2008, 800 adults living within rural Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia were enrolled in a 2 year prospective cohort study of zoonotic influenza transmission. Apart from symptomatic human influenza infections a single symptomatic H5N1 infection of avian origin was identified.
Interestingly a handful of symptomatic avian influenza infections were identified using patient sera. Using a conservative WHO accepted cut off for serum titers one individual scored positive using a H9N2 test virus and two others for a H12N5 virus. As the titer of human H5N1 convalescent sera wanes within one year these numbers are probably underestimates.
The paper shows that more strains of avian influenza viruses infect man than judged by symptomatic infections. Spill over resulting in asymptomatic infection could well be relatively common with symptomatic infections being a subset.
Gray GC, Krueger WS, Chum C, Putnam SD, Wierzba TF, Heil GL, Anderson BD, Yasuda CY, Williams M, Kasper MR, Saphonn V, Blair PJ.
PLoS One. 2014 May 12;9(5):e97097. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0097097. eCollection 2014.
In 2008, 800 adults living within rural Kampong Cham Province, Cambodia were enrolled in a 2 year prospective cohort study of zoonotic influenza transmission. Apart from symptomatic human influenza infections a single symptomatic H5N1 infection of avian origin was identified.
Interestingly a handful of symptomatic avian influenza infections were identified using patient sera. Using a conservative WHO accepted cut off for serum titers one individual scored positive using a H9N2 test virus and two others for a H12N5 virus. As the titer of human H5N1 convalescent sera wanes within one year these numbers are probably underestimates.
The paper shows that more strains of avian influenza viruses infect man than judged by symptomatic infections. Spill over resulting in asymptomatic infection could well be relatively common with symptomatic infections being a subset.
Thursday, May 8, 2014
May 8, 2014
Time to settle the synthetic biology controversy
Nature. 2014 May 8;509(7499):135. doi: 10.1038/509135a.
Two comments were prompted by this piece from ter Meulen.
Synthetic biology: Missing the point.
Evans SW and others.
Nature. 2014 Jun 12;510(7504):218. doi: 10.1038/510218b.
Synthetic biology: A global approach
Keasling JD and others
Nature 2014 Jun 12;510(7504):218. doi: 10.1038/510218c.
The first contains two sentences that are relevant to GOF-discussed.
“…supporting synthetic biology is not about making sure that science can go wherever it wants: it is about making the type of society people want to live in.”
“It is not unknown for scientists themselves to foster exaggeration and uncritical acceptance of claims, or to focus on anticipated benefits rather than on risks.”
Personal opinion
Synthetic biologists do not intend to make microbes that threaten humankind. If ever such an organism arose they may well be horrified. The intent of avian GOF influenza A virus research is to make novel viruses that are dangerous for humans with the idea of using them to develop vaccines and drugs, claims that do not hold water.
Nature. 2014 May 8;509(7499):135. doi: 10.1038/509135a.
Two comments were prompted by this piece from ter Meulen.
Synthetic biology: Missing the point.
Evans SW and others.
Nature. 2014 Jun 12;510(7504):218. doi: 10.1038/510218b.
Synthetic biology: A global approach
Keasling JD and others
Nature 2014 Jun 12;510(7504):218. doi: 10.1038/510218c.
The first contains two sentences that are relevant to GOF-discussed.
“…supporting synthetic biology is not about making sure that science can go wherever it wants: it is about making the type of society people want to live in.”
“It is not unknown for scientists themselves to foster exaggeration and uncritical acceptance of claims, or to focus on anticipated benefits rather than on risks.”
Personal opinion
Synthetic biologists do not intend to make microbes that threaten humankind. If ever such an organism arose they may well be horrified. The intent of avian GOF influenza A virus research is to make novel viruses that are dangerous for humans with the idea of using them to develop vaccines and drugs, claims that do not hold water.
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