Animal Models for Influenza Virus Pathogenesis and Transmission.
Bouvier NM, Lowen AC.
Viruses. 2010;2(8):1530-1563. doi:10.3390/v20801530
A useful overview of influenza virus animal models.
Tuesday, July 27, 2010
Monday, February 1, 2010
2010
The emergence of pandemic influenza viruses
Y Guan, D Vijaykrishna, J Bahl, H Zhu, J Wang, GJD Smith
Protein & Cell 2010, 1(1): 9–13 DOI 10.1007/s13238-010-0008-z. Epub 2010 Feb 7.
An easy to follow account with figures of the origin of human pandemic flu viruses.
Y Guan, D Vijaykrishna, J Bahl, H Zhu, J Wang, GJD Smith
Protein & Cell 2010, 1(1): 9–13 DOI 10.1007/s13238-010-0008-z. Epub 2010 Feb 7.
An easy to follow account with figures of the origin of human pandemic flu viruses.
Sunday, January 1, 2006
2006
Avian influenza virus infections in humans
SSY Wong and KY Yuen
Chest 2006; 129:156–168.
“Besides hospital-acquired infections, laboratory-acquired infections during the postmortem examination of A/H7N2-infected seals have been reported. The 1977 A/H1N1 strain was believed to have been originated from a laboratory in Russia. In 2005, an isolate of A/H2N2 virus was erroneously sent to laboratories in 18 countries in a proficiency testing program. Therefore, faulty laboratory precautions can also be a source for pandemics.”
SSY Wong and KY Yuen
Chest 2006; 129:156–168.
“Besides hospital-acquired infections, laboratory-acquired infections during the postmortem examination of A/H7N2-infected seals have been reported. The 1977 A/H1N1 strain was believed to have been originated from a laboratory in Russia. In 2005, an isolate of A/H2N2 virus was erroneously sent to laboratories in 18 countries in a proficiency testing program. Therefore, faulty laboratory precautions can also be a source for pandemics.”
Monday, November 7, 2005
November 7, 2005
The InterAcademy Panel (IAP) statement on biosecurity
“1. Awareness. Scientists have an obligation to do no harm. They should always take into consideration the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their own activities. They should therefore:
• always bear in mind the potential consequences – possibly harmful – of their research and recognize that individual good conscience does not justify ignoring the possible misuse of their scientific endeavour;
• refuse to undertake research that has only harmful consequences for humankind.
…
5. Oversight. Scientists with responsibility for oversight of research or for evaluation of projects or publications should promote adherence to these principles by those under their control, supervision or evaluation and act as role models in this regard.”
Article 1 is pretty clear. Article 5 clearly identifies funders, their reviewers and journal editorial staff as guardians that should set an example.
Unfortunately very few people know about the IAP statement. Those that do invariably are national academy members. There was no pedagogic effort made on behalf of the member academies to make this known to PIs and those at the bench.
“1. Awareness. Scientists have an obligation to do no harm. They should always take into consideration the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their own activities. They should therefore:
• always bear in mind the potential consequences – possibly harmful – of their research and recognize that individual good conscience does not justify ignoring the possible misuse of their scientific endeavour;
• refuse to undertake research that has only harmful consequences for humankind.
…
5. Oversight. Scientists with responsibility for oversight of research or for evaluation of projects or publications should promote adherence to these principles by those under their control, supervision or evaluation and act as role models in this regard.”
Article 1 is pretty clear. Article 5 clearly identifies funders, their reviewers and journal editorial staff as guardians that should set an example.
Unfortunately very few people know about the IAP statement. Those that do invariably are national academy members. There was no pedagogic effort made on behalf of the member academies to make this known to PIs and those at the bench.
Sunday, December 31, 2000
Abbreviations
- ABSA American Biological Safety Association
- ASM American Society for Microbiology
- ASV American Society for Virology
- BWC Biological Weapons Convention
- CDC Centers for Disease Control (USA)
- CFR Case fatality ratio
- CWG Cambridge Working Group
- DURC Dual use research of concern
- EMC Erasmus Medical Center (Netherlands)
- ECDC European Centers for Disease Control
- ESWI European scientific working group on influenza
- ESCAIDE European scientific conference on applied infectious disease epidemiology
- FAO-OIE Food and Agriculture Organization - Office International des Epizooties
- FVR Foundation for Vaccine Research
- GOF Gain of function
- H5N1 Influenza A virus with H5 hemagglutinin and N1 neuraminidase proteins at viral surface
- H7N9 Influenza A virus with H7 hemagglutinin and N9 neuraminidase proteins at viral surface
- HHS (US Department of) Health and Human Services
- HPAI Highly pathogenic avian influenza
- IOM Institute of Medicine (US)
- KNAW Koninklijke Nederlanse Akademie van Wetenschappen Royal Dutch Academy of Arts and Sciences
- LPAI Low pathogenic avian influenza
- MERS Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
- MERS-CoV Middle East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus
- MPS Max Planck Society (Germany)
- NAS National Academy of Sciences (US)
- NIAID Nation Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases (US)
- NIH National Institutes of Health (US)
- NRC National Research Council (US)
- NSABB National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (US)
- RS Royal Society (UK)
- SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
- SARS-CoV Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus
- SFA Scientists For Science
- USG US government
- VWS VolkswagenStiftung (VW Foundation, Germany)
- WHO World Health Organization
The Author
Simon Wain-Hobson became involved in GOF influenza research because the purported benefits did not match up with his knowledge of human virus evolution gained from having worked for 27 years on the molecular genetics of HIV.
With Sir John Skehel, they organized the first open conference on the subject - H5N1 research: biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics - at the Royal Society on April 3-4, 2012.
It was organized by The Foundation for Vaccine Research, The Royal Society and the Academy of Medical Sciences, and sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Fondation Mérieux, the American Society for Microbiology, the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, Institut Pasteur and the Society for General Microbiology.
This meeting was available on the web for 2 years following the conference and can still be viewed at http://royalsociety.org/events/2012/viruses/
Since that meeting he has taken a position on the subject and written about it:
An avian H7N1 gain-of-function experiment of great concern
Wain-Hobson S
MBio. 2014 Oct 14;5(5). pii: e01882-14. doi: 10.1128/mBio.01882-14.
The irrationality of GOF avian influenza virus research
Wain-Hobson S
Front Public Health. 2014 Jul 16;2:77. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00077. eCollection 2014.
Pandemic influenza viruses: Time to recognize our inability to predict the unpredictable and stop dangerous gain-of-function experiments.
Wain-Hobson S
EMBO Mol Med 5, 1637-1641 2013
Gain of function: unknown risks
Rey F, Schwartz O, Wain-Hobson S
Science. 2013 Oct 18;342(6156):311. doi: 10.1126/science.342.6156.311-a.url
H5N1 viral-engineering dangers will not go away
Wain-Hobson S
Nature. 2013 Mar 28;495(7442):411. doi: 10.1038/495411a.
He has no grant support for this work.
Simon Wain-Hobson obtained his DPhil in biophysics from the University of Oxford.
Following a post-doc at the Weizmann Institute in Israel, he moved to Paris where he switched to human virology, working notably on the AIDS virus HIV, from the earliest hour.
Being the first to publish its genetic map, his group went on to show that it evolved from a chimpanzee virus. They highlighted with exquisite precision the phenomenal genetic variation and rapid evolution of HIV.
After more than 25 years work on the molecular genetics of AIDS virus his group found a remarkable connection that allowed them to move into cancer research - cancer genomes too harbor phenomenal numbers of mutations and rearrangements. The Pasteur group showed that the human genome encodes a DNA mutator enzyme, APOBEC3A, which can mutate chromosomal DNA. It is now accepted that this enzyme is an endogenous mutagen on a par with ultraviolet light and cigarette smoke.
Simon Wain-Hobson is Professor at the Institut Pasteur and has published more than 200 papers. A member of the European Molecular Biology Organization, Academia Europaea, he is Director of the French papillomavirus reference laboratory. He won the André Lwoff prize in 1996 and Athena prize from the French Academy of Sciences in 2007 and is Officier de la Légion d’Honneur. He is Board Chair of the Foundation for Vaccine Research in Washington DC.
With Sir John Skehel, they organized the first open conference on the subject - H5N1 research: biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics - at the Royal Society on April 3-4, 2012.
It was organized by The Foundation for Vaccine Research, The Royal Society and the Academy of Medical Sciences, and sponsored by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Fondation Mérieux, the American Society for Microbiology, the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, Institut Pasteur and the Society for General Microbiology.
This meeting was available on the web for 2 years following the conference and can still be viewed at http://royalsociety.org/events/2012/viruses/
Since that meeting he has taken a position on the subject and written about it:
An avian H7N1 gain-of-function experiment of great concern
Wain-Hobson S
MBio. 2014 Oct 14;5(5). pii: e01882-14. doi: 10.1128/mBio.01882-14.
The irrationality of GOF avian influenza virus research
Wain-Hobson S
Front Public Health. 2014 Jul 16;2:77. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00077. eCollection 2014.
Pandemic influenza viruses: Time to recognize our inability to predict the unpredictable and stop dangerous gain-of-function experiments.
Wain-Hobson S
EMBO Mol Med 5, 1637-1641 2013
Gain of function: unknown risks
Rey F, Schwartz O, Wain-Hobson S
Science. 2013 Oct 18;342(6156):311. doi: 10.1126/science.342.6156.311-a.url
H5N1 viral-engineering dangers will not go away
Wain-Hobson S
Nature. 2013 Mar 28;495(7442):411. doi: 10.1038/495411a.
He has no grant support for this work.
Simon Wain-Hobson obtained his DPhil in biophysics from the University of Oxford.
Following a post-doc at the Weizmann Institute in Israel, he moved to Paris where he switched to human virology, working notably on the AIDS virus HIV, from the earliest hour.
Being the first to publish its genetic map, his group went on to show that it evolved from a chimpanzee virus. They highlighted with exquisite precision the phenomenal genetic variation and rapid evolution of HIV.
After more than 25 years work on the molecular genetics of AIDS virus his group found a remarkable connection that allowed them to move into cancer research - cancer genomes too harbor phenomenal numbers of mutations and rearrangements. The Pasteur group showed that the human genome encodes a DNA mutator enzyme, APOBEC3A, which can mutate chromosomal DNA. It is now accepted that this enzyme is an endogenous mutagen on a par with ultraviolet light and cigarette smoke.
Simon Wain-Hobson is Professor at the Institut Pasteur and has published more than 200 papers. A member of the European Molecular Biology Organization, Academia Europaea, he is Director of the French papillomavirus reference laboratory. He won the André Lwoff prize in 1996 and Athena prize from the French Academy of Sciences in 2007 and is Officier de la Légion d’Honneur. He is Board Chair of the Foundation for Vaccine Research in Washington DC.
Meetings & Discussions
December 10-12
VolkswagenStiftung (Volkswagen Foundation) and the Max Planck Society sponsored conference on DURC
An open conference, no registration fee
Hannover, Germany
http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/dualuseresearch
November 19-21
BCPS London Royal Society
For details and program
http://biochemsec2030.org/2014/06/26/conference-on-bio-chem-st-and-security-royal-society-19-21st-november-2014/
November 20
Policy Lates: Dodging a biological bullet – what can we learn from the US and Europe about Biosecurity?
UK Society for Biology
Charles Darwin House, 12 Roger Street, London
November 19
European Academies Scientific Advisory Committee GOF working group in Frankfort airport.
Second meeting January 23, Brussels
November 5-7
European Scientific Conference on Applied Infectious Diseases Epidemiology (ESCAIDE) meeting organized by the ECDC in Stockholm
Plenary session devoted to GOF on November 6
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/ESCAIDE/programme/Pages/overview.aspx
Results of an electronic questionnaire that took place at the end of the plenary session on GOF research
October 22
New NSABB committee meeting, Washington DC
http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-biotechnology-activities/event/2014-10-22-121500-2014-10-22-200000/nsabb-meeting
June 25
KNAW debate on GOF url
For a report click here. It will soon be up on the KNAW website.
2013-2011
There were other meetings in the US in this period.
To be updated.
December 12, 2013
Royal Society meeting, London
A small closed discussion on how to advance debate on the GOF.
No publically available summary.
September 5-9, 2013
International Society for Influenza and other Respiratory Virus Diseases (ISIRV),
Cape Town.
Marc Lipsitch came in on video.
July 3, 2013
The risk of misuse in the biosciences
University of Freiburg, Germany
Das Missbrauchrisko in den Biowissenschaften
Veranstalter: Prof. Dr. Silja Vöneky und Constantin Teetzmann, Institut für Öffentliches Recht, Abteilung 2 (Völkerrecht und Rechtsvergleichung), und Kompetenznetzwerk für das Recht der zivilen Sicherheit (KORSE), Universität Freiburg
February 6-8, 2013
Freedom in biological research: How to consider accidental or intentional risks for populations
Fondation Mérieux Conference center; Les Pensières, Veyrier-du-Lac, France
April 3-4, 2012
Royal Society meeting on H5N1 research: biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics
It was organized by The Foundation for Vaccine Research, The Royal Society and the Academy of Medical Sciences.
Sponsored by Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Fondation Mérieux, the American Society for Microbiology, the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, Institut Pasteur, and the Society for General Microbiology.
Chairpersons Sir John Skehel FRS and Simon Wain-Hobson.
This meeting was available on the web for 2 years following the conference and can still be viewed at
http://royalsociety.org/events/2012/viruses/
For more than two years it remained the only open meeting on the subject that has been convened. Journalists were present.
February 16-17, 2012
WHO meeting Geneva.
This was an invitation only meeting funded in large part by the US NIAID. For a report click here.
September 12, 2011
European Scientific Working group on Influenza (ESWI) in Malta.
This is the meeting where Ron Fouchier started off the three year debate or controversy on GOF. It was not recorded or webcast. However, some idea of what transpired can be found at
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2011/12/30/what-really-happened-in-malta-this-september-when-contagious-bird-flu-was-first-announced/
VolkswagenStiftung (Volkswagen Foundation) and the Max Planck Society sponsored conference on DURC
An open conference, no registration fee
Hannover, Germany
http://www.volkswagenstiftung.de/dualuseresearch
November 19-21
BCPS London Royal Society
For details and program
http://biochemsec2030.org/2014/06/26/conference-on-bio-chem-st-and-security-royal-society-19-21st-november-2014/
November 20
Policy Lates: Dodging a biological bullet – what can we learn from the US and Europe about Biosecurity?
UK Society for Biology
Charles Darwin House, 12 Roger Street, London
November 19
European Academies Scientific Advisory Committee GOF working group in Frankfort airport.
Second meeting January 23, Brussels
November 5-7
European Scientific Conference on Applied Infectious Diseases Epidemiology (ESCAIDE) meeting organized by the ECDC in Stockholm
Plenary session devoted to GOF on November 6
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/ESCAIDE/programme/Pages/overview.aspx
Results of an electronic questionnaire that took place at the end of the plenary session on GOF research
October 22
New NSABB committee meeting, Washington DC
http://osp.od.nih.gov/office-biotechnology-activities/event/2014-10-22-121500-2014-10-22-200000/nsabb-meeting
June 25
KNAW debate on GOF url
For a report click here. It will soon be up on the KNAW website.
2013-2011
There were other meetings in the US in this period.
To be updated.
December 12, 2013
Royal Society meeting, London
A small closed discussion on how to advance debate on the GOF.
No publically available summary.
September 5-9, 2013
International Society for Influenza and other Respiratory Virus Diseases (ISIRV),
Cape Town.
Marc Lipsitch came in on video.
July 3, 2013
The risk of misuse in the biosciences
University of Freiburg, Germany
Das Missbrauchrisko in den Biowissenschaften
Veranstalter: Prof. Dr. Silja Vöneky und Constantin Teetzmann, Institut für Öffentliches Recht, Abteilung 2 (Völkerrecht und Rechtsvergleichung), und Kompetenznetzwerk für das Recht der zivilen Sicherheit (KORSE), Universität Freiburg
February 6-8, 2013
Freedom in biological research: How to consider accidental or intentional risks for populations
Fondation Mérieux Conference center; Les Pensières, Veyrier-du-Lac, France
April 3-4, 2012
Royal Society meeting on H5N1 research: biosafety, biosecurity and bioethics
It was organized by The Foundation for Vaccine Research, The Royal Society and the Academy of Medical Sciences.
Sponsored by Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Fondation Mérieux, the American Society for Microbiology, the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, Institut Pasteur, and the Society for General Microbiology.
Chairpersons Sir John Skehel FRS and Simon Wain-Hobson.
This meeting was available on the web for 2 years following the conference and can still be viewed at
http://royalsociety.org/events/2012/viruses/
For more than two years it remained the only open meeting on the subject that has been convened. Journalists were present.
February 16-17, 2012
WHO meeting Geneva.
This was an invitation only meeting funded in large part by the US NIAID. For a report click here.
September 12, 2011
European Scientific Working group on Influenza (ESWI) in Malta.
This is the meeting where Ron Fouchier started off the three year debate or controversy on GOF. It was not recorded or webcast. However, some idea of what transpired can be found at
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2011/12/30/what-really-happened-in-malta-this-september-when-contagious-bird-flu-was-first-announced/
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