ASM Statement on Dual Use Research of Concern and Biosafety
This document emphasizes two chains of thought. First, scientists must respect the rules and regulations in force. Secondly, scientific freedom must be maintained as much as is possible. Nobody can quibble.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 GOF research is specifically mentioned and the HHS/NIH is clearly in charge. They should consult with the scientists and if changes to existing guidelines are necessary, so be it. With its diverse membership that goes beyond the US, the ASM is in a unique position to provide a broad and informed source of opinion second to none. Yet it calls on the NAS “…to consider whether the current scope of GOF research offers the benefits that merit taking the risks inherent in performing that research…”.
The ASM pushes up and away the problem as to the risks and benefits of such work despite having a large membership, many coming from virology. The benefits of GOF influenza virus research have been shown to be wanting by several commentators. The risks are there, small we do agree but not zero, while the compound risk will increase as more and more microbiologists get into GOF/DURC research.
Time and time again the piece repeats the importance unencumbered scientific enquiry. Safety must be balanced “with the need to conduct legitimate research and diagnostic testing that is vital to making new scientific discoveries and combatting infectious diseases”. Yet this is standard policy around the globe.
Thursday, July 31, 2014
Monday, July 28, 2014
July 28, 2014
Scientists for Science
The statement supports ongoing GOF research and “Most importantly, we are united as experts committed to ensuring public health is not compromised and the reputation of science in general, and microbiology in particular, is defended.”
Agreed.
The statement supports ongoing GOF research and “Most importantly, we are united as experts committed to ensuring public health is not compromised and the reputation of science in general, and microbiology in particular, is defended.”
Agreed.
Sunday, July 20, 2014
July 20, 2014
TWIV294
The opinions of the Cambridge Working Group (CWG) are sidelined without ceremony and are considered to represent an extremist view. Not once were arguments given as to why these people, that include eminent microbiologists such Barry Bloom of Harvard and David Relman from UCSF and President of the Infectious Disease Physicians of America, to mention just two, are barking up the wrong street. Paul Berg and Stanley Falkow, architects of the 1975 Asilomar meeting have signed on as well as highly respected virologists, bacteriologists and international lawyers.
Vincent Racaniello maintains that sufficient procedures are in place and that GOF researchers followed them. He considers that the CWG has not listened to the other sides’ arguments. Dickson Despommiers, who is a parasitologist, said that the CWG is unhappy because they haven’t been agreed with.
“The CWG is damaging science irreparably”. Lipsitch (an organizer of CWG, “doesn’t understand the amount of collateral damage” he is creating, and is simply “increasing public distrust in science”.
We learn that risk-benefit analyses are absurd as it is very difficult to quantify risk and benefits of most research. This is very revealing comment for there is huge field in risk assessment and risk management. Insurance companies and re-assurers compute risk out to 20 years or more, meaning that they take a long view. It is so mature a field that there are even risk communication consultants. See October 14, 2014.
We learn that any Asilomar type meeting must not be organized by members of the CWG. They may attend. Alan Condit, perhaps, goes on to say that the same applies to members of Scientists For Science, a web page set up by Racaniello in response to the CWG, which is accepted and leads on to a discussion of which neutral third party might play the go between.
Marc Lipsitch from Harvard Medical School is dismissed out of hand because he is an epidemiologist and presumably cannot understand virology. Yet it was the US epidemiologist Palmer Beasley who established beyond a shadow of doubt that prior hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection was linked to the onset of hepatocellular carcinoma (Beasley et al., 1981). Beasley then went on to push for extremely early vaccination of babies in Taiwan which is now the standard of care in endemic areas. He became the author of HBV immunization policies for the World Health Organization.
A parasitologist with one PubMed reference including the word “virus” is more qualified to comment on GOF virology than an epidemiologist who has 56 such references.
Dickson Despommier makes a parallel with the decommissioning nuclear plants and considers it a more important issue than the GOF. Suffice to say that in the nuclear arena, for decades the pressure has been to reduce proliferation based on the idea that the more structures there are the greater the risk of an accident. Undoubtedly there are other political motivations in this field but anti-proliferation has been a buzz word for ages. For an alternative view see Rath, 2014.
The parallel with the control of rinderpest viral stocks is revealing. Rinderpest was/is the measles virus of cattle and is only the second virus to be eradicated since 2001.
To reduce the risk of a lab accident, the FAO-OIE are calling to reduce the number of labs holding rinderpest viral stocks from 30 to around 10, which is the equivalent to reducing the number of centers handling nuclear material.
Despommier continues with the opponents of GOF research in no uncertain terms. It starts with a form of questioning: “are they some right wing group” which reminds him of the McCarthy era in that they have a jaundiced view of science…
References
Beasley RP, Hwang LY, Lin CC, Chien CS. (1981). Hepatocellular carcinoma and hepatitis B virus. A prospective study of 22 707 men in Taiwan. Lancet. 2:1129-33.
The opinions of the Cambridge Working Group (CWG) are sidelined without ceremony and are considered to represent an extremist view. Not once were arguments given as to why these people, that include eminent microbiologists such Barry Bloom of Harvard and David Relman from UCSF and President of the Infectious Disease Physicians of America, to mention just two, are barking up the wrong street. Paul Berg and Stanley Falkow, architects of the 1975 Asilomar meeting have signed on as well as highly respected virologists, bacteriologists and international lawyers.
Vincent Racaniello maintains that sufficient procedures are in place and that GOF researchers followed them. He considers that the CWG has not listened to the other sides’ arguments. Dickson Despommiers, who is a parasitologist, said that the CWG is unhappy because they haven’t been agreed with.
“The CWG is damaging science irreparably”. Lipsitch (an organizer of CWG, “doesn’t understand the amount of collateral damage” he is creating, and is simply “increasing public distrust in science”.
We learn that risk-benefit analyses are absurd as it is very difficult to quantify risk and benefits of most research. This is very revealing comment for there is huge field in risk assessment and risk management. Insurance companies and re-assurers compute risk out to 20 years or more, meaning that they take a long view. It is so mature a field that there are even risk communication consultants. See October 14, 2014.
We learn that any Asilomar type meeting must not be organized by members of the CWG. They may attend. Alan Condit, perhaps, goes on to say that the same applies to members of Scientists For Science, a web page set up by Racaniello in response to the CWG, which is accepted and leads on to a discussion of which neutral third party might play the go between.
Marc Lipsitch from Harvard Medical School is dismissed out of hand because he is an epidemiologist and presumably cannot understand virology. Yet it was the US epidemiologist Palmer Beasley who established beyond a shadow of doubt that prior hepatitis B virus (HBV) infection was linked to the onset of hepatocellular carcinoma (Beasley et al., 1981). Beasley then went on to push for extremely early vaccination of babies in Taiwan which is now the standard of care in endemic areas. He became the author of HBV immunization policies for the World Health Organization.
A parasitologist with one PubMed reference including the word “virus” is more qualified to comment on GOF virology than an epidemiologist who has 56 such references.
Dickson Despommier makes a parallel with the decommissioning nuclear plants and considers it a more important issue than the GOF. Suffice to say that in the nuclear arena, for decades the pressure has been to reduce proliferation based on the idea that the more structures there are the greater the risk of an accident. Undoubtedly there are other political motivations in this field but anti-proliferation has been a buzz word for ages. For an alternative view see Rath, 2014.
The parallel with the control of rinderpest viral stocks is revealing. Rinderpest was/is the measles virus of cattle and is only the second virus to be eradicated since 2001.
To reduce the risk of a lab accident, the FAO-OIE are calling to reduce the number of labs holding rinderpest viral stocks from 30 to around 10, which is the equivalent to reducing the number of centers handling nuclear material.
Despommier continues with the opponents of GOF research in no uncertain terms. It starts with a form of questioning: “are they some right wing group” which reminds him of the McCarthy era in that they have a jaundiced view of science…
References
Beasley RP, Hwang LY, Lin CC, Chien CS. (1981). Hepatocellular carcinoma and hepatitis B virus. A prospective study of 22 707 men in Taiwan. Lancet. 2:1129-33.
Wednesday, July 16, 2014
July 16, 2014
The irrationality of GOF avian influenza virus research
Wain-Hobson S.
Front Public Health. 2014 Jul 16;2:77. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00077. eCollection 2014.
The paper takes a detailed look at the claims put forward by the GOF influenza researchers to justify their work. The vaccine claim in particular doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.
Wain-Hobson S.
Front Public Health. 2014 Jul 16;2:77. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2014.00077. eCollection 2014.
The paper takes a detailed look at the claims put forward by the GOF influenza researchers to justify their work. The vaccine claim in particular doesn’t hold up to scrutiny.
Monday, July 14, 2014
July 14, 2014
Cambridge Working Group Consensus Statement on the Creation of Potential Pandemic Pathogens (PPPs)
This is a statement resulting from the discussion of 18 researchers and concerned individuals in Boston. It expresses concern about the ongoing GOF research and calls for it to be curbed. It was ultimately signed by 295 individuals including Paul Berg and Stanley Falkow, architects of the 1975 Asilomar conference.
This is a statement resulting from the discussion of 18 researchers and concerned individuals in Boston. It expresses concern about the ongoing GOF research and calls for it to be curbed. It was ultimately signed by 295 individuals including Paul Berg and Stanley Falkow, architects of the 1975 Asilomar conference.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)