ASM Statement on Dual Use Research of Concern and Biosafety
This document emphasizes two chains of thought. First, scientists must respect the rules and regulations in force. Secondly, scientific freedom must be maintained as much as is possible. Nobody can quibble.
Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) H5N1 GOF research is specifically mentioned and the HHS/NIH is clearly in charge. They should consult with the scientists and if changes to existing guidelines are necessary, so be it. With its diverse membership that goes beyond the US, the ASM is in a unique position to provide a broad and informed source of opinion second to none. Yet it calls on the NAS “…to consider whether the current scope of GOF research offers the benefits that merit taking the risks inherent in performing that research…”.
The ASM pushes up and away the problem as to the risks and benefits of such work despite having a large membership, many coming from virology. The benefits of GOF influenza virus research have been shown to be wanting by several commentators. The risks are there, small we do agree but not zero, while the compound risk will increase as more and more microbiologists get into GOF/DURC research.
Time and time again the piece repeats the importance unencumbered scientific enquiry. Safety must be balanced “with the need to conduct legitimate research and diagnostic testing that is vital to making new scientific discoveries and combatting infectious diseases”. Yet this is standard policy around the globe.
