Thursday, October 16, 2014

October 16, 2014

Improving pandemic influenza risk assessment.
Russell CA, Kasson PM, Donis RO, Riley S, Dunbar J, Rambaut A, Asher J, Burke S, Davis CT, Garten RJ, Gnanakaran S, Hay SI, Herfst S, Lewis NS, Lloyd-Smith JO, Macken CA, Maurer-Stroh S, Neuhaus E, Parrish CR, Pepin KM, Shepard SS, Smith DL, Suarez DL, Trock SC, Widdowson MA, George DB, Lipsitch M, Bloom JD.
Elife. 2014 Oct 16;3:e03883. doi: 10.7554/eLife.03883.

“Abstract 
Assessing the pandemic risk posed by specific non-human influenza A viruses is an important goal in public health research. As influenza virus genome sequencing becomes cheaper, faster, and more readily available, the ability to predict pandemic potential from sequence data could transform pandemic influenza risk assessment capabilities. However, the complexities of the relationships between virus genotype and phenotype make such predictions extremely difficult. The integration of experimental work, computational tool development, and analysis of evolutionary pathways, together with refinements to influenza surveillance, has the potential to transform our ability to assess the risks posed to humans by non-human influenza viruses and lead to improved pandemic preparedness and response.”

Predictions are extremely difficult while the genotype-phenotype relationship (how to understand biological potential from genetic data) is a very tough call.

The conclusion starts with:
“It is currently not possible to predict which non-human influenza A virus will cause the next pandemic. Reducing the impact of the next pandemic will rely on early detection and mitigation strategies that slow the early spread to allow more preparatory work to be done.”

The first sentence is in keeping with what others have said (Morse et al., 2012; Morens et al., 2013; Wain-Hobson 2013). It undermines the claims that GOF research would help with pandemic preparedness. If the next pandemic cannot be predicted, this means that the strain cannot be identified. In turn this means that preventive vaccines and drugs cannot be made. The second sentence is more pragmatic and can be readily adhered to.

The paper is interesting for three authors of this eLife paper have been proponents of GOF influenza research while one has been against.

References
Prediction and prevention of the next pandemic zoonosis.
Morse SS, Mazet JA, Woolhouse M, Parrish CR, Carroll D, Karesh WB, Zambrana-Torrelio C, Lipkin WI, Daszak P.
Lancet. 2012 Dec 1;380(9857):1956-65. doi: 10.1016/S0140-6736(12)61684-5.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673612616845

Pandemic influenza viruses--hoping for the road not taken.
Morens DM, Taubenberger JK, Fauci AS.
N Engl J Med. 2013 Jun 20;368(25):2345-8. doi: 10.1056/NEJMp1307009. Epub 2013 Jun 5. 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp1307009

Pandemic influenza viruses: time to recognize our inability to predict the unpredictable and stop dangerous gain-of-function experiments.
Wain-Hobson S.
EMBO Mol Med. 2013 Nov;5(11):1637-41. doi: 10.1002/emmm.201303475. Epub 2013 Oct 24. 
http://embomolmed.embopress.org/content/5/11/1637.long